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Abstract: This paper challenges conceptions of political corruption that rely on 
standards external to politics and explores an understanding of corruption as 
something that is part of the internal policing of politics.  The paper draws attention 
to the multiple, conflicting ideas and principles that contribute to our understanding 
of corruption but argues that these often generate over-moralised and over-
generalized and can become corrosive of the compromises and procedures that are 
central to political rule.  The paper shows that recent accounts of political corruption 
often have highly attenuated understandings of ‘politics’ and are over-expansive in 
their normative commitments, and argues that how we understand and talk about 
the corruption of politics is of major significance for the stability and effectiveness of 
the political orders of Western societies.  
Keywords: corruption, political realism, accountability, politics, public office, 
definition, virtue. 
 
I.  Ideals and Politics 
In Book IX of Republic (580c-590), Socrates asks Glaucon to imagine fashioning a multi-
coloured beast, with a ring of many heads that it can grow and change at will. He is then 
asked to fashion a lion and a human being, and then to join the three of them into one, and 
to cover it with the appearance of a single human being.  Socrates’s image is intended to 
illustrate the benefits of justice over injustice: with it being appropriate to ‘subordinate the 
beastlike parts of our nature to the human – or better, perhaps, to the divine’ and shameful 
to enslave the gentle to the savage.1  Although Socrates presents the image in a discussion 
of the individual and justice, there is also an intended parallel with the polis.  It must be 
ordered by wisdom, it must contain and control the conflicting elements of the multi-
coloured beasts within it, and it must harmonise through reason and discipline the 
conflicting elements of which it is comprised so that all the elements in the state are ruled 
by the highest part. 
This ideal order provides an external standard for probity and corruption.  Corruption occurs 
when the appropriate standard for conduct in the public realm is violated by people in 
public or judicial office acting on motives and incentives that should be excluded from 
decision-making in such office.   
In the Republic, the political world is the multi-coloured, multi-headed beast2: it consists in a 
plurality of conflicting objectives with mixed and thereby impure motives that combine 
interests, passions, and sentiments, and with rationality playing a largely instrumental role. 
Only if the beast is ruled by wisdom can it be tamed and ordered.  On this picture, the 
concern is not with the corruption of politics, but with the corruption of an ideal order by 
politics.  Indeed, for the Plato of the Republic, political corruption would seem to be no 
more than a tautology.   
Over the last thirty years political scientists and economists have in various ways replicated 
Plato’s position (albeit using widely different principles).   We do not often think of 
economists as Platonists, but much neo-classical economics shares the view that the 
natural/ ideal order is distorted or corrupted by state and government regulation that  
interferes with incentives and creates opportunities for rents.3  Similarly, much republican 
political theory identifies a conception of the state as securing the common good for its 
citizens and sees factionalism and the pursuit of private interests in the state as corrupting 
the attainment of the common good.4  Both perspectives thereby deny that politics is 
fundamentally a response to deep conflicts of interests over which there is inevitably an 
ongoing struggle for power to establish a never wholly consensual or stable settlement.   
Both assume an ideal order, deviations from which are seen as involving corruption by 
politics. Even the more pragmatic approaches in public choice, which attempt to design 
mechanisms for incentivising behaviour, see institutional design as an external process of 
framing politics so as to reward some motives and penalize others according to a set of 
external criteria for good order.  They do not acknowledge that their own position is itself 
inherently political and contestable in character.    
Many ideal-based approaches also treat principles of conduct for public office as principles 
of morality or as ethical virtues and thereby as deep-seated features of character.  Acting 
well in public office is seen as a function of having a good character; corrupt acts are seen as 
springing from and betraying the flaws of the individual’s character.  In the hands of some 
commentators, this becomes a somewhat Manichean issue: corruption and the corrupt are 
evil, the good act well, making possible the good polity. Judgments about corruption in 
these approaches are grounded in reference to more basic claims about order and justice 
that give these judgments their normative weight.   
In contrast to these approaches, this paper proposes that we consider corruption from 
within politics, and draws on the insights of a realist perspective on political theory.  This 
view underlines the difficulty of establishing an ideal basis for assessments in politics, and 
points to the widely varied ways of understanding public office and its demands even in 
Western political systems, let alone more widely. Western traditions tend to promote an 
ideal of bureaucratic objectivity and impartiality that underpin most recent definitions of 
corruption.  This view is plausibly appropriate to (a particular conception of) administrative 
office, but is much more difficulty to apply to political office.  Moreover, while definitions 
can be improved there remains a core contestability to them that lies at the heart of politics 
itself.  In exploring the way we conceptualise political corruption my concern is to resist a 
range of recent attempts to widen and deepen the scope of political corruption, which have 
affected both academic debates and public commentary on politics. In both cases, as used 
by many modern commentators, the language of corruption presumes ideal standards that 
are inappropriate to much politics, can encourage a toxic level of accountability, and can de-
stabilize elements in the political process.  
 
In trying to understand political corruption from within politics my approach has some 
limited similarity with recent literature on ‘institutional corruption’, which identifies 
standards internal to and operative in a particular domain or set of institutions that provides 
a context for asking how far particular practices or actions support or subvert the 
institution.5 This approach raises four problems: whether there is an uncontentious account 
of those standards; whether the criteria derived from that account predicate only and 
exactly the appropriate set of actions, without excluding other actions that we see as 
corrupt or including actions we do not regard as corrupt; which elements appropriately 
demarcate a distinctive domain, or group an appropriate set of institutions for them to act 
as the frame for understanding an instance of corruption; and what it is that provides a 
common element that allows the term to be used intelligibly across a range of domains or 
institutions? Moreover, although this approach can work well with the analysis of 
corruption among officials in bureaucratic structures, it sits less comfortably with political 
office and with politics more broadly.  Here the definition of corruption is necessarily less 
stable. Struggles within politics are simultaneously struggles over the nature of politics and 
the standards that should be institutionalized and applied.  As such, they remain inherently 
political and contested: they are a part of the mêlée, they are not above the fray.  
Consequently, there is little prospect of full convergence in judgments either within or 
across different political orders.  The ‘Platonist’ approach judges political corruption by sets 
of standards external to politics; the institutional approach localises standards to the ends 
of the institution; but the alternative proposed here points to the variability, complexity and 
contestability at the heart of politics which can provide only unstable ground on which to 
build the strong normative judgments that many commentators see as central to 
corruption.    
 
 
 
II Political realism 
 
My account here is influenced by recent debates on realism in political theory.6 At the heart 
of what I take to be plausible versions of a realist critique of liberal thinking about politics is 
less a denial of the reality of values in the political sphere and more a recognition that, while 
these exist, they are always potentially in conflict. Fundamental conflicts between values 
means that any political ordering will involve trade-offs and will play down some areas of 
value while promoting others. Consequently, any particular ordering will be, to some 
degree, partial, and this will be true both for procedures (since these will involve imposing 
one particular reading of what the right balance of fairness, equality, justice, and rights of 
participation requires) and for outcomes. Those outcomes will, in consequence, command 
only limited legitimacy and will be only more or less stable.  Moreover, the ability to get 
solutions to stick, and the claims on and use of the resources needed to do so (financial, 
material, ideological, persuasive and coercive) is a political process that is non-neutral, 
involves components of coercion and fiat, and is inherently local – being concerned with 
which issues need resolving here and now, and what compromises can be negotiated and 
enforced.7   
 
On this view, what Bernard Williams calls the ‘basic legitimation demand’, will not be met 
equally for all participants, except under conditions of such unanimity of commitments that 
we should doubt that politics and its attendant compromises is necessary.8  All legitimation 
is conditional, partial and potentially fragile, shored up (sometimes tightly consolidated, 
sometimes barely), by historical experience, traditions and habits, and backed by systematic 
enforcement by coercive institutions. Legitimacy has many sources and many degrees, but 
the basic realist insight is that we cannot assume a free and open consensus as a foundation 
for politics, that political orders cannot long be sustained by such means, and that an 
irreducible element in politics is the laying claim to, and the exercise of, power – above all 
the power to impose solutions and to compel compliance.  Similarly, there can be no 
unidimensional, linear metric of power allowing systematic comparison between states of 
affairs – how many are coerced, manipulated or cowed and to what extent involves judging 
across multiple dimensions of value, taking account of the conflicting commitments that 
generate the political problem that needs solving, and considering the way in which 
decisions are made, justified, and implemented.  We can usually distinguish in rough terms 
between the very bad and the somewhat better, and we can occasionally recognise some 
Pareto improvements, but most judgments about A being better than B rely on giving 
priority to some goods, values or ends, over others, and those judgments cannot be wholly 
consensual and impartial.  
 
Agreement on political standards is also forged politically and is always potentially open to 
objection by some element of the community. In societies with liberal democratic traditions 
and procedures, and an accompanying political discourse of legitimation that emphasises 
the rights of the citizen and the responsibilities of those in power, precision in the 
characterisation of the responsibilities of public office plays an integral part of its 
legitimation, and certain types of critiques or challenges to such characterisation can have 
serious implications for sustaining the legitimacy of the political order.    
 
Seeing political corruption from within politics, means seeing it as part of the self-policing of 
a particular system of rule, and also as a rhetoric that can challenge political rule or 
particular decisions. The self-policing can be adjusted and reformed, and made more 
sensitive to those perspectives whose sense of the legitimacy of the order is most fragile 
and conditional. But where the political rhetoric demands uncompromising adherence to 
foundational values, the order and its legitimacy can be deeply threatened. Where this 
happens, political rule will be experienced as more heavy handed, and may indeed need to 
become so.  In areas where an order’s legitimacy is most fragile it is especially vulnerable to 
attack from more universalist and idealist positions.  In such cases, political discourse has 
some responsibility to concern itself both with matters of substance and with 
acknowledging the procedures, rituals and discourses of legitimation upon which the 
political order rests.  To be concerned with corruption in politics, rather than by it, means 
that we should recognise that our understanding of corruption in the West, is very closely 
tied to the compromises we have struck in the establishment of our political systems, and 
that challenging that understanding simultaneously challenges those compromises and the 
claims to legitimacy that sustains them.   
 
 
III. Integrity in public office 
 
On most standard interpretations, corruption involves those in public office using it to serve 
their own ends rather than those of the public. In modern, Western bureaucratic systems 
there is widespread agreement that public officials are expected to set aside their private 
interests in undertaking their official commitments.  Although there is wide variation in the 
constructions of public office and of the lines between administrative and political office 
amongst Western states (for example, in the interpretation of the roles of senior public 
officials in the USA, France, Germany and the UK)9, the literature on corruption tends to 
assume a relatively standard model. This allows Bo Rothstein to emphasise the importance 
of impartiality as the principle at stake when public officials act corruptly.10  In accepting 
public office the agent accepts that the role confers responsibilities that trump their private 
interests.  Moreover, these roles are generally understood as constructs of rules and norms 
that are to be fully implemented.11  
 
This model of administrative public office is widely held:  corruption occurs when office 
holders use their office to pursue their own advantage, rather than serving the public. Not 
all derelictions of duty are corrupt: public servants can be idle, incompetent, prejudiced or 
can act ultra vires.  Most definitions of corruption want to leave such cases outside the 
definition of corruption, while recognising them as forms of malfeasance.  Similarly, there is 
an issue about when a public official’s behaviour should be seen in terms of other categories 
of self-serving behaviour – such as theft, fraud, or venality – rather than being ‘corrupt’.  If 
corruption is to avoid becoming a catch-all category (which dramatically weakens its 
normative force) we need a clear line between such infractions and corruption.  This is often 
provided by emphasising the extent to which corrupt officials (A) are implicated in triadic 
relations that distort the legitimate use of office to serve some interests (C) (which should 
not benefit) rather than others (B) (which should), while profiting from the distortion 
through the acceptance of incentives or benefits.  
 
The slipperiness of the understanding of corruption becomes evident when we note that the 
emphasis on formal role leaves open a number of elements. For example, if we emphasise 
compliance with rules and norms what weight do we ascribe to people’s motives for acting? 
Some see the terms of office as requiring a certain sort of person with a distinct set of 
personal and moral qualities or virtues – other emphasise behaviour, not motive.  This latter 
view is in sharp contrast to Plato’s account of the guardians and it sits uncomfortably with a 
good deal of republican rhetoric and with at least some understandings of the nature of 
religious integrity.12  On these accounts, the qualities needed in office – virtue, virtu, 
spiritual insight - are taken to be qualities that should dominate other aspects of people’s 
lives, in most cases to the point of wholly excluding other motives and interests.13  
 
The more parsimonious approach is evident in the Seven Principles of Public Life set out by 
the UK’s Committee on Standards in Public Life in 1995.14  The principles of Selflessness, 
Integrity, Objectivity, Accountability, Openness, Honesty, and Leadership are seen as implicit 
in and integral to certain types of liberal-democratic, constitutional government.  The 
principles and the ‘descriptors’ that gloss them, spell out general principles for the conduct 
of those holding public office; but they are not a catalogue of personal or moral qualities.  
This separation of office from character and morality is disquieting to many since mere 
conformity to rules and norms does not guarantee that the agent acts well – viz., the Nazi 
bureaucrat, the vindictive border guard or the inflexible refugee assessor.   In each case, our 
discomfort with such cases arises from an expectation that the official ought to have a 
deeper integrity to provide some critical purchase on his or her formal role and its demands.  
At the same time, many think that public officials should exhibit compliance with the rules 
and loyalty and commitment to the order and should leave aside their moral impulses.  
 
These tensions point to instabilities at the heart of Western conceptions of public office that 
flow from the fact that our expectations for public office represent a set of compromises on 
a range of issues and principles.  They also derive from and import some of the 
commitments of early modern thinking about corruption (originally in relation to the 
corruption of church and doctrine, or in relation to the republic), together with an 
Enlightenment legacy of instrumental and technocratic conceptions of government 
administration, which sought to eliminate tradition, custom, and informality in the 
development and maintenance of institutions.  In each case we retain elements of the 
language and expectations but deploy them in a dramatically changed context. 
 
These tensions and contrasting tendencies are evident in the definition of political 
corruption.  Most standard definitions of corruption are not informative. ‘Corruption 
involves the abuse of public office for private gain’15, does not tell us what counts as an 
abuse (or what is a distinctively corrupt abuse); it encompasses many things like simple 
theft that seem distinct from corruption; it is overly restrictive in implying that private 
institutions cannot be corrupt and in restricting gain to private gain (when factional or party 
gain is often a major force for corruption); and it makes no mention of those who try illicitly 
to influence the way that those in office behave towards the public whose interests are 
harmed (the corruptors).  David Beetham’s recently proposed redefinition - “Distortion and 
subversion of the public realm in the service of private interests”16 - is similarly flawed: what 
counts as distortion or subversion might narrow down types of ‘abuse’ – but gives us no 
criteria by which to identify what these involve, and no criteria for distinguishing this set of 
cases as cases of corruption. ‘The public realm’ is much broader than public office, and 
presumes it is a single coherent domain whereas in practice competing conceptions of the 
public realm and its ends will make whether or not something is corrupt a function of one’s 
preferred conception. The ‘service of private interests’ is really no better than ‘private gain’ 
– and is open to the same objections about people who act in ways that are not motivated 
by private interests but who don’t, for example, follow the rules.    
 
No definition is watertight, in large part because different elements jostle for attention and 
vary in relevance and intensity across contexts and time. My own – ‘Corruption in politics 
occurs where public official (A) violates the rules and/or norms of office, to the detriment of 
the interests of the public (B) (or some subsection thereof), which is the designated 
beneficiary of that office, to benefit themselves or a third party (C) who rewards or 
otherwise incentivises A to gain access to goods or services they would not otherwise 
obtain’17 – pulls together aspects of both public-office and public-interest definitions, but 
these remain in tension since constructions of public office and its responsibilities often part 
company with conceptions of the public interest.  The definition has the virtue that almost 
any case that meets all the conditions will be recognised as a case of corruption.18 However, 
many cases that are seen as corrupt might meet only some conditions: the public may 
benefit incidentally or to a lesser extent; the public official may be responding to threats not 
incentives; and the benefit might be one that that the corruptor could have won in open 
public tender.  Moreover, the definition is hard to apply in cases of corruption in relation to 
party funding (where no ‘public official’ may be involved), and it does not capture the 
populist use of corruption to denounce perceived exploitation of the masses by elites.19 No 
one condition is necessary, and different combinations of conditions that fall short of 
including all, might nonetheless prove sufficient.  Bo Rothstein and Aiysha Varraich have 
suggested that the definition is flawed because its three components are essentially ‘empty 
shells’.  ‘The shortcomings of these core values are that they are only applicable in a setting 
where the political culture is clearly shared and there are rules governing the conduct of 
both public officials and members of the pubic in their dealings with officials.’20 But this 
misses three points: i. that fleshing out political corruption must involve situating the core 
definition within a particular political culture and filling out the elements in that context 
(unless one assumes an external, stipulative account, as does the impartiality account); ii. 
that political corruption does for the most part presume the existence of well-developed 
and delineated political cultures;  iii. and that what the definition captures, in relation to 
politics, is that something is politically corrupt when the legitimated exercise of political rule 
is subverted so that the compromises and decisions of a political order are not in fact being 
implemented.21  In my view, this is a non-trivial account of what corrupts political decisions 
and exercises of power and authority.22 
 
Commentators who have sought to impose unity and coherence on the field by identifying a 
single desiderata that is taken to be at the heart of probity or corruption impose more 
consistency and coherence across political cultures than is plausible.  This is true for 
Rothstein’s appeals to impartiality,23 but is still more so in the case of Laura Underkuffler 
who takes the bolder step of claiming that what holds ascriptions of corruption together is 
the view that corruption is fundamentally concerned with character.  We should understand 
the claim of corruption as one that ‘describes an individual’s deepest character. It is the 
capture, by evil, of one’s soul.’24  This view is unapologetically haunted by fears of 
inappropriate motives, demanding that people do the right thing for the right reasons, even 
though we have very little reason for thinking that people in public office in the West have 
wholly unalloyed motives.  ‘There must be an alternative moral and ethical system which is 
aggressively advocated, and which is eventually regarded by officials and citizens as in their 
best individual and collective interests.  A different normative system must be internalized 
by individuals and institutionalized as policy.’25 This is tantamount to a demand 
fundamentally to change human nature. It also tries to explain a difficult concept by 
appealing to a still more controversial one.   
 
In contrast to such trends, recent US Supreme Court judgments have stipulated that the 
core descriptive sense of corruption (albeit specifically in relation to members of 
legislatures) is quid pro quo.  This has subsequently provoked critics to appeal to expanded 
definitions in a way that further widens the scope of corruption and challenges some of the 
deeper inequalities of wealth and power in modern societies, even though doing so 
simultaneously embroils the concept in a set of debates about the intentions of the 
Founding Fathers and the nature of modern democracy. 26   
 
That the definition of political corruption is so troublesome arises from the variety of the 
sources for our thinking and the strong normative commitments that attach to them, from 
the fact that political contexts vary considerably, and because people’s positions are often 
politically freighted.  Since the World Bank’s decision to treat corruption as an economic 
(not political) problem there has been a dramatic rise in publications on corruption and in 
anti-corruption activity, and that has also been associated with a rise in the use of the term 
in public discourse.27  In popular usage, for the most part, the judgment of corruption is 
treated as one of character not merely of behaviour, it assumes universality, and it treats 
corruption as a ‘thick’ ethical concept, combining normative and descriptive elements. 28    
Indeed, the uptake of the term in legislative and electoral politics as a general term of moral 
condemnation that accuses those in power of using their position to further partisan, 
factional, or personal ends, has become increasingly widespread.  A 2015 Gallup Poll in the 
USA, found that 75% of respondents agreed that ‘corruption is widespread throughout the 
government of this country.’ 29  Similarly hostile judgments have been made of the 
governments of Western Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe states have struggled over 
the last twenty-five years with a corrosive culture of partisan accusation masquerading as 
moral repugnance to those in power.30  The result is a range of claims, largely driven by ideal 
conceptions of the political order, combined with a visceral populist mistrust of 
governmental institutions, which find in the language of corruption a way to challenge the 
political order and to find it wanting. 
 
The use of such inflated moral and ideological rhetoric in relation to public administration 
further undermines trust in the public service and often prompts attempts to increase 
popular accountability and further to delimit professional or bureaucratic autonomy.  These 
moves sometimes promote aspects of public service, but as a sweeping popular rhetoric it 
can hamper decision-making, hollow out trust in institutions, and create a dependence of 
the public service on politicians that serves sectional rather than public-regarding interests.  
The institution of trust in public officials in modern democratic societies is a fragile 
achievement that is relatively easily damaged and populist claims of corruption can 
generate demands for accountability that are potentially toxic. 31   
 
I take the precise and consistent identification of cases of political corruption within political 
systems to be fragile achievements that are worth preserving. There is no set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the use of the term that both identify a discrete set of events 
and capture the full range of intuitions that accompany the term but, within any reasonably 
developed political system, criteria exist to pick out a core cases, even if any particular 
criterion can also generate cases that provoke disagreement.  Against the demand for a 
clear moralised conception of corruption that claims cross-cultural validity, a realist 
conception of politics recognises that our definitions are limited and tailored to particular 
contexts and concerns, and will not perfectly align with our intuitive moral (and political) 
reactions.  On this view, more sweeping understandings of corruption that purport to offer 
more consistency and that draw on theological or republican traditions, ideals of 
impartiality, or intense moral conviction, are wholly inapt as standards for the widely 
diverse political cultures of modern societies, and come with expectations that are over-
demanding for the pluralist regimes we inhabit.  Moreover, even where there is sufficient 
convergence across advanced western societies to acknowledge shared criteria for assessing 
administrative public office, definitional disputes become more bitter and divisive in relation 
to the conduct of political office.  
 
 
 
IV. The assessment of political conduct 
 
Political office stands in a very different relationship to impartiality than does administrative 
office.  Political decisions are not impartial, and (by definition) cannot be. They are not 
necessarily self-interested but, as Bernard Williams puts it, in them someone ‘has lost’.32 
Politicians seek office by appeals to partial, sectional and particular interests as well as to 
general considerations.  Political decisions favour some values, end and interests over 
others.  Although the struggle for power is partly constrained by rules and procedures that 
define the process, underlying the exercise of political office is some sense that, in winning, 
one has the opportunity (perhaps a mandate, perhaps an obligation) to pursue some ends, 
values and goods rather than others.     
 
Moreover, in many political systems politicians see themselves as appropriately self-
regulating: they are elected to exercise their judgment, including judgment about what does 
or does not need regulation, and about appropriate and inappropriate conduct in political 
office.33  Moreover they do so while factoring in considerations such as how to enhance 
their subsequent electoral prospects, how to raise campaign funds, how to present their 
policies in a more, rather than a less favourable light, and so on.  This means that elements 
that are integral to winning, keeping, and exercising office sit together in an unstable and 
potentially conflicting mix with positional obligations, strategic political action, and 
prudential behaviour. 
 
A great deal of political philosophy in the last fifty years has been directed to constructing 
political orders from first principles; rather little has addressed the nature of political rule 
and the character of political office.34  At a minimum, such reflection should acknowledge 
that the occupants of political office must respond to a range of considerations that are 
distinct from the formal obligations of their political office but are integral to the process of 
competing for, holding on to, and exercising office - not the least of which concerns 
politicians’ abilities to maintain their hold on political power against those contending with 
them.  We should also recognise that the political world is not identical to the morality of 
private life. As Montaigne put it, reflecting on his experience in the civil wars of France in 
the 16th Century:   
 Once I made an assay at using in the service of some political manoeuvrings , such 
 opinions and rules of life as were born in me or instilled in me by education – rough, 
 fresh, unpolished and unpolluted ones, the virtues of a schoolboy or a novice, which 
 I practice, if not conveniently at least surely, in my private life. I found that they were 
 inapplicable and dangerous. Anyone who goes into the throng must be prepared to 
 side-step, to squeeze with his elbows, to dodge to and fro and, indeed, to abandon 
 the straight path according to what he encounters; he must live not so much by his 
 norms but by those of others; not so much according to what he prescribes to 
 himself but to what others prescribe to him, and according to the time, according to 
 the men, according to the negotiations.35 
Even complying with the formal requirements of political office is not a clear cut imperative. 
For those in supreme executive office, formal requirements underdetermine action, they 
can be conflicting, and in some cases they may jeopardise larger political responsibilities.  
Making political decisions often involves precisely judgments about what the politician 
should or should not do that goes beyond what s/he is formally (and minimally) positively 
required to do.  It is not just that there is larger scope for discretion (that is clearly the case); 
it is also that judgment plays a much more major role in determining and interpreting the 
responsibilities of political office than in administrative public office.  One dimension, as 
Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel have emphasised, is that political judgment has to take 
a consistently more consequentialist line on many issues – and more so than those in public 
(as distinct from political) office.36  Moreover consequentialist judgments cannot be wholly 
a matter of following formal rules, since such decisions rely on interpretations of the 
objectives of political rule and about the weight to be given to different components among 
the conflicting values and principles in the wider community.  
 
Faced with this messy reality, we might be tempted to try to constrain those in public office 
more effectively by increasing the determinacy of regulation and requirements.  This 
strategy faces three difficulties:  Increasing regulation of politicians hands power and 
discretion to the regulators and we have no reason to suppose that they have necessarily 
higher probity or impartiality (the ‘Juvenal problem’ viz: quis custodiet ipsos custodies).  We 
also need the political process to pass whatever regulations we want to see implemented, 
and we thereby must enter the fray, rather than standing above it, and we too must be 
prepared to negotiate and compromise.  Finally, the strategy ignores the fact that we have 
politics because we have fundamental disagreements that need to be authoritatively and 
determinately ordered, and that if we have systems that cannot take, enforce, and 
legitimate such decisions, and respond to the emergence of new divisions and conflicts, we 
create the conditions for crisis and collapse.  
 
This is not to say that political office should be untrammelled. Most Western states have 
developed distinctions between formal and political dimensions of political office:  the 
formal is what the office requires according to statute, formal procedural requirements, and 
institutional conventions; the political refers to how occupants interpret the powers, 
responsibilities, and purposes designated by their formal position, the processes by which 
policies are chosen and pursued, and the means they are prepared to endorse to secure the 
desired outcome.   Most legislatures have bodies, (sometimes independent of them, 
sometimes not) that conduct disciplinary proceedings against members who violate formal 
rules of Parliament; and members of legislatures are also held to account politically, at 
elections, through legislative debate and questions, and through public scrutiny.   While the 
distinction is, I think, clear, political judgment necessarily plays a central role in interpreting 
much of the ‘soft’ formal regulation surrounding office, which can make claims of corruption 
extremely contentious. 
 
Nonetheless, much public commentary on and reactions to politicians obscures these 
differences between the formal components of office and matters of political judgment; and 
between formal and political accountability.   And politicians sometimes get these things 
badly mixed up – resolving consequentialist considerations in ways that ride rough shod 
over public trust (for example Nixon in Watergate and subsequently), or setting aside 
careful evaluation of consequentialist considerations in favour of absolute principle or moral 
commitment (perhaps Blair in Iraq).   Indeed, the two dimensions frequently pull in different 
directions – few want unprincipled consequentialists, but nor do they want moralists who 
stick to values irrespective of the costs they impose.37 We probably want politicians to be 
decent people and to be politically savvy and effective so as to survive the political struggle; 
but the conditions of modern politics, (at least in adversarial political systems that are 
relatively open to public scrutiny) make it difficult to sustain the illusion that these are 
wholly compatible requirements. And the expectations and the language that most ordinary 
people bring to the evaluation of political office (and that commentators, media, and rival 
politicians often encourage them to bring), generally looks for virtue, integrity, and 
judgment of a more or less uncompromised form.  Yet the job politicians have to do, and the 
challenges they have to negotiate, often work against such uncompromising commitments. 
The result is an instability at the heart of the public evaluation of and of the legitimation for 
those in politics.  
 
Politicians are flawed, they judge issues partially, and they pursue a number of potentially 
conflicting ends simultaneously: they have to defend their personal and political interests in 
holding on to office, while pursuing wider political and sectional ends; and their role is 
‘judgment heavy’ and regulation light.   From the outside, they seem self-seeking and 
corrupt, to a much greater extent than is the case for most officials.  Moreover, because 
they are our representatives and we see them as serving our interests, our standards are 
sometimes still higher than they are for public officials.38  ‘Throwing the rascals out’ is one 
common version of what they deserve, 39   and there have been repeated demands to clean 
up Washington and Westminster (and elsewhere).  
 
Nonetheless, the problems of political office are exacerbated by destructive spirals of 
decaying public trust.  When trust declines people demand increased scrutiny - with 
surveillance and accountability mechanisms functioning as a substitute for the perceived 
lack of integrity. Increased scrutiny of political office may make responsible political 
decision-making in highly charged contexts substantially more difficult.  Politicians often 
need room in which outcomes, probabilities, and policy can be explored and compromises 
hammered out without immediate exposure to the public gaze. Finding an agreement that 
will stick and that people can commit to often requires that the precise character of the 
bargaining is shielded from wider scrutiny or publicity.  People have been distressed by 
some of the deals made in the process of developing a peace agreement in Northern 
Ireland. There must be a question about whether the extent of these concessions was in fact 
necessary to conclude the peace process, but it is worth reflecting on how that question 
might be answered.  If those involved judged them to be necessary, then we have to take it 
as a matter of political judgment that ending the war justified making those particular deals. 
Our ex-post judgment might be different, and we may punish people politically for the 
decisions they took – but (unless we can prove that they were struck for illicit gain) there 
are no formal grounds for doing so.  Politicians will be reticent about exactly what was on 
the table, preferring to celebrate the deals they have struck. Yet, invoking freedom of 
information to reveal all will have an effect on what ministers can do, or can record having 
done, and will also have an impact on their ability to make deals and to ensure that these 
stick.   
 
Negotiation and compromise are essential in politics, but they become more difficult the 
more the public know in advance the options and the commitments that people have made, 
since that knowledge makes it costly for politicians to change their minds or may make them 
seem to be resiling from expressed commitments.  Because other people in the political 
world know this, they leak information to make it more difficult for a government or party, 
or minister to adopt a particular course or to change it. Furthermore, the more hostile you 
see your environment as being, the more cagey you are likely to be, and that can become a 
seriously destructive spiral, generating an increasingly vigilant press, increasingly paranoid 
behind closed doors decisions, active spinning and briefings against one’s opponents, and a 
sharp decline in collective political responsibility.  Ongoing debates in the UK over the 
‘Brexit’ process raise many such concerns: in a context of bitter populist mistrust and 
negativity towards government it is hard to see how an open process of negotiation can 
take place; but the more closed the process, the more fragile the legitimacy of the outcome 
will be.  Moreover, political and formal accountability are often confused, and people use 
formal mechanisms for political ends, especially where there are low levels of trust, high 
political stakes, and/or weak commitments to procedures.  The proliferation of news media 
and commentary add to the complexity: politicians need the media to convey their policies 
and to conduct the political fight with opposing parties; but that commits them to 
relationships that often prove intolerant of the rough and tumble of political decision-
making, the necessities of political compromise, and the non-linear formation of policy.  
 
On this account, a number of tensions are inherent in the politics of many modern, largely 
liberal, democratic states.   We might take a Platonist view and see this as the result of the 
conflicting instincts of self-interested partisans.  But, there are more credible conceptions of 
politics than this and there are several potential ways of proceeding in setting out a 
conception of politics from the inside that avoids the utopian moment, while retaining the 
capacity to conceive of corruption in, rather than by politics.40  
 
In characterising the political realm from the inside we should emphasise the fragility of and 
limited scope for impartiality, upon which public expectations of public office tend to rely, 
and we can point to the problems that arise for impartiality where multiple conflicting 
dimensions of value require authoritative ordering, but where no ordering can give all 
reasonable constellations of value equal weight. This alone provides a powerful counter to 
some of the more naïve liberal certainties about the possibilities for a politics purged of 
emotion, interests, conflict, and power.   
 
Within this more complex picture of the political realm, how should we understand claims 
about political corruption?  The claims to authority and legitimacy by most Western political 
systems  are conditional on a range of procedures, practices, right and privileges that are 
rooted in various historical, institutional and conventional norms and practices.  They are 
political systems, whose rules and requirements distinguish appropriate and inappropriate 
conduct, probity and corruption, albeit in precise and detailed and hard to generalize ways. 
This makes claims about corruption a much more local phenomenon that addresses the 
inconsistency between one’s conduct and motives and the prescribed norms or rules of 
office.  
 
On this view our understanding of public office in the West involves a range of components 
that, within our particular political cultures, can give a precise set of meanings to political 
and public office corruption.  These are largely built around a conception of office that 
dominates the occupant’s private interests, but the exact set of expectations, the lines 
drawn in relation to motives, and the degree of trust reposed in such offices, varies 
considerably, being deeply affected by the history, traditions, and understandings that have 
grown up around the practices and institutions of different states.  Different cultures have 
developed sets of rules and expectations in response to the particular contexts and conflicts 
they faced, and have produced orders that are able to sustain, for the most part, broad 
legitimacy.   
At the same time, it is clear that such ‘local’ readings of corruption often do not satisfy 
people – they lack the conclusive moral weight usually attached to ‘corruption’, ‘evil’, 
‘subversion’, etc.  Bled of the expectations generated by the claim to high moral ground, the 
claim of political corruption comes down to saying that X has broken the rules in a certain 
manner (with a certain intent, in ways that subvert aspects of official duty and the 
legitimate exercise of authority).  Political cultures can also press local understandings in 
more ideal directions and develop much more demanding conceptions of office, 
accompanied with more encompassing conceptions of public office corruption.  But these 
broader claims are not neutral – they are not a crusade above the fray.  They are themselves 
intrinsically political, although they often deny this.  How far such claims are a cause for 
concern depends on the extent to which these claims corrode the legitimacy accorded to 
and the trust reposed in public office.    
 
The narrower, more technical, and more local understanding of corruption in most Western 
systems generates a relatively restrained and precise evaluative language that provides 
constructive responses and reforms within the procedures and institutions of the polity.    In 
contrast, claims that, for example, party funding in the USA is corrupt because it reproduces 
substantial economic inequalities in the political sphere, and works against principles we 
share by living in a democracy in which civil and political rights are claimed to be equal, 
over-reach. The inequalities of influence strongly suggest that the system is flawed on its 
own understanding, but is it (and those involved in it) corrupt?41 Such claims are more 
dangerous the less compromising and more demanding they are, and the less they 
acknowledge their own intrinsically political character.   
 
Of course, there are states whose political orders are insouciant to their citizens, 
unconcerned to rule by procedure and impartial practice, and interested in more 
systematically exploiting their domination over their subjects.  Nothing I have said denies 
this.  With Williams we should recognize that liberalism (in this case, in relation to a set of 
standards for public office) is a language uniquely suited to the basic legitimation demand in 
advanced western states; but it cannot function for states with different historical and 
cultural legacies42 and we need to address the problems of constructing more robust 
traditions of public office in states that currently identify political power as an opportunity 
for plunder. In doing so, we cannot assume that we can simply transfer our world to them; 
and we ought to be sure that we understand our own political orders and their 
particularities and vulnerabilities first.   
 
Western politicians can be corrupt and many political systems betray strong currents of 
ethical drift.  In most groups, members adjust their behaviour in line with their 
understanding of how other members of the group behave.  This ensures that the norms 
and principles of the practice are shared in the community but it carries the risk that they 
become separated from wider public understanding.  Moreover, the political ‘bubble’ may 
leave some aspects of people’s conduct tacitly unobserved while being ethically dubious, as 
in Britain’s MPs’ expenses scandal.  Also, power ‘corrupts’, producing misjudgments arising 
from a sense of self-importance – or encouraging people to favour those who flatter their 
self-importance.  In addition, struggles in which political accountability encroaches on the 
territory of formal requirements often bleed into controversies over procedures and 
principles, politicising them in their turn and quickly developing into wider contests over 
legitimacy.  ‘Toxic accountability’ can turn decision-making into a battlefield, in which the 
process can be seriously damaged, with public trust in politicians and institutions 
evaporating, and encouraging more partisan demands for control and accountability.   Much 
in politics tests people’s conduct and judgment.  The result is an unstable mix – the 
tendency of those in political office to drift or hubris, the tendency among the electorate to 
confuse personal and political qualities and dimensions of accountability, and a more 
general waning of trust in those in power that demands ever higher levels of accountability 
and transparency. 
 
These are good reasons for identifying more intelligent forms of accountability. These might 
accord politicians the space to deliberate on options and the time to formulate responses to 
problems, recognising that they may need to change their minds in the light of evidence or 
to respond to political exigencies that make the securable compromise something that falls 
short of the initial ambition but is nonetheless worth having. We can ask subsequently 
whether they got as good a deal as they could have got; but that is a matter of political 
accountability and one where political rules of engagement apply. That means that 
politicians cannot be expected to be wholly open and candid about what they tried to 
achieve in the process, what obstacles they faced, and what compromises they had to make. 
There are also formal questions, about whether/to what extent they acted in keeping with 
their positional responsibilities (and, where that is an issue, other forms of inquiry may be 
necessary).  But these need asking by the right bodies.  Crucially, almost any media 
questioning (in virtue of opening the politician to public scrutiny) will inevitably be treated 
as political and responded to as such – that is, prudently, without any obligation for full 
disclosure.  That is why media inquiry about behaviour that raises formal questions is 
fraught ground (since it is being asked in a political arena which immediately colours it).  
 
The ether in which people fight for, defend and see through their policies is deeply and 
intrinsically political. In that process, politicians have to weigh up what they are formally 
obliged to say or do, and beyond that, what it is expedient to say and whether, by not 
answering, they create problems for themselves for which they will end up paying too high a 
price – because they cannot carry their colleagues with them, because it leaves them 
vulnerable to opposition questions, or because it will lose them their post, or their re-
election.  But believing that there are clear high moral principles available here involves 
making a mistake about the nature of political contestation.   
 
On this account, and pace recent claims, there is not much scope for transforming our 
political cultures or for dramatically increasing personal integrity among politicians.  The 
aspiration for more ‘morality’ is troubling at many levels, but most crucially because one 
reason we have political procedures and institutions is authoritatively to resolve conflicts 
over the limits to which some people’s moral convictions can be allowed to dominate those 
of others.  Politics (and subsequently, decision and law)43 is the process through which such 
clashes are settled – and any particular claim to high moral ground has only the standing 
that it can win in the political process.  Bidding for public support for a view (however 
moral) is a political act – and, as such, it competes with others in the political arena and has 
no special status.  Much of the time actors in the public domain (perhaps especially 
journalists) seek to persuade us that things are other than this – but that too is politics.  As 
Montesquieu commented, with particular reference to England: ‘In absolute monarchies, 
journalists betray the truth because they do not have the liberty to tell it; in extremely free 
states, they betray the truth because of their very liberty for, as it always produces divisions, 
each one becomes as much the slave of the prejudices of his faction as he would be of a 
despot.’ 44 
 
This is not to say that politics is undifferentiated.  One of the achievements of many western 
political systems has been the development of procedures, institutions and practices that 
have secured widespread compliance and that come increasingly to frame and delimit areas 
of distinctively political activity.  We protect those institutions and practices through a 
variety of formal institutions and offices and various types and processes of accountability.  
In doing so, political contestation is to some degree contained and does not break out into 
open conflict. But these procedures and practices are fragile.  This makes it crucial that we 
support the formal elements of the system.  If we recognize legitimation as the ether in 
which political systems operate, and acknowledge that such legitimation cannot rest fully on 
rationality or impartiality, then we should be addressing the question of how to sustain a 
public or civic culture and a political discourse that respects and supports these distinctions 
and the institutions that police them.  What I hope to have conveyed is that this is not easily 
achieved or sustained, and that many of the central participants – whether politicians or 
journalists – often misjudge some of the central issues about what is procedural and what 
political and have incentives to over-reach and overstate their claims in ways that can 
weaken the integrity of the political system.  Moreover, a more sociologically and 
institutionally informed political philosophy might usefully address more directed and local 
questions about what needs sustaining and what should be questioned in the mix of forces 
that secure the legitimacy of particular political orders. 
 
V  Conclusion 
 
Commentators have drawn attention to the differences between the Republic and earlier 
dialogues, such as the Gorgias, in which the ‘forms’ play no role.  Nonetheless, there is a 
consistency to the unsettling character of Plato’s questioning across these texts.  When 
Socrates demonstrates that Gorgias and his colleagues hold contradictory or implausible 
beliefs, he weakens the crowd’s support for them; but he comes empty handed.  He appears 
as an innocent abroad, discomfiting those who claim the political as their territory, while 
denying that he has any knowledge of that territory.  But the aporia that his questioning 
generates is not a stable state: decisions must be taken, laws made, order legitimated and 
sustained, security maintained.  In doing so, some interests, values and ends are served to a 
greater extent than others.  The challenge is not to establish wholly impartial decision-
making or rational principles but (in their inevitable absence) to establish systems and 
procedures that ensure that, to a greater or lesser extent, within the bounds of realistic 
possibility, those subject to the outcomes of decisions can mostly acknowledge them as 
having a degree of legitimacy, (perhaps, that losers do not lose too badly, that compliance 
relies only lightly on coercion, that winners show moderation, and that those who exercise 
power do so more for collective than for sectional ends; albeit in each case recognising that 
these judgements are ‘on balance’, imperfect, and potentially in tension).  
 
Understood as part of the terminology of politics, rather than as appealing to a set of ideal 
standards outside of it, the claim that politics can be corrupted may support that legitimacy. 
But it can also come to challenge it - much rests on how it is deployed.  In the case of 
political office, the precise definition of the offence of political corruption, and the 
indictment of individuals for specific infringements of rules, is less corrosive to the political 
order than blanket claims that dispute the legitimacy of the system as a whole, or its 
political class. Sustaining these distinctions requires dull, precise work, and political theorists 
have often responded to the attractions of following their preferred normative thrust for 
the concept rather than sticking to its strict descriptive content within a determinate 
political system.   Yet, the more inflated rhetoric of corruption takes no hostages – the 
accused are fallen men and women, self-seeking, corrupt in character, evil, beyond 
redemption.  That rhetoric can call on deep-rooted traditions of theological and republican 
thought that have little time for the niceties of context and complexities of motivation.  But 
in plural, somewhat liberal, and somewhat democratic societies, whose achievement has 
been to build civic and political systems that tolerate a range of value commitments and 
protect individuals from the moral crusades of their fellow citizens, this kind of rhetoric can 
dramatically weaken the legitimacy of the political order and increase its instability.  On the 
account I have proposed here, there is corruption in politics but politics is not itself 
intrinsically corrupt, and there is some responsibility for our political philosophy to 
recognise and to work with that. 
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